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State of Emergency Acts Review Commission used to hold off proper legal review 
Tarik Olcay* 
Since the failed coup attempt of 15 July, the Turkish government (‘the Government’) has 
been carrying out an unprecedented purge and has already dismissed over 125,000 public 
officials, including judges, prosecutors, academics, military staff, police officers, and shut 
down over 4,000 non-governmental organisations, ranging from private universities to 
national and local media outlets.1 The declaration of a state of emergency on 21 July, which 
authorised the Government to issue decree-laws with virtually no constitutional limits, made 
this massive purge possible. While a number of officials have been dismissed by their 
respective institutions, some 91,000 people have been dismissed directly by way of lists 
appended to Decree-Laws No. 668, 669, 670, 672, 673, 675, 677, 679, 683. 
Although decree-laws are subject to constitutional review by the Turkish Constitutional Court 
(‘the Constitutional Court’), Art. 148/1 of the Turkish constitution immunises state of 
emergency decree-laws from constitutional review. Since decree-laws are functionally 
legislative acts, they are not normally subject to administrative judicial review either. The 
only legal remedies remaining for those dismissed by a decree-law are, therefore, the 
constitutional complaint mechanism to the Constitutional Court and the individual application 
mechanism to the European Court of Human Rights (‘the ECtHR’), both of which are limited 
to establishing violations of the rights protected in the European Convention on Human 
Rights and are not mechanisms to challenge the legality of the acts. 
Following the purges, the people dismissed have sought various legal remedies. Some applied 
to first instance administrative courts or directly to the Council of State (Danıştay) to 
challenge the legality of the decree-law concerned, others applied to the Constitutional Court 
or the ECtHR, claiming their rights have been violated. The Council of State has rejected the 
cases and referred the applicants to first instance administrative courts,2 but these courts too 
have ruled that reviewing decree-laws is outwith their jurisdiction.3 Likewise, the 
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Constitutional Court received more than 60,000 applications after 15 July alone,4 but is yet to 
decide any. The ECtHR, however, decided two cases inadmissible, ruling that the applicants 
are required to lodge a constitutional complaint to the Constitutional Court in order to exhaust 
the domestic remedies.5 The Republican People’s Party (CHP), the main opposition party, 
took the decree-laws to the Constitutional Court for annulment, yet the Constitutional Court 
dismissed the request for lack of jurisdiction, abandoning its long-established jurisprudence 
of reviewing state of emergency decree-laws as to whether they are in line with the 
necessities and limits of the state of emergency.6 
On 23 January 2017, exactly six months after the purges began, as a result of the 
accumulation of applications and growing international pressure over human rights violations 
under the twice-extended state of emergency, the Government established the State of 
Emergency Acts Review Commission (‘the Commission’) by Decree-Law No. 685. The 
Commission will review and decide the individual applications against the provisions of 
decree-laws regarding dismissals, closing of non-governmental organisations, and stripping 
retired staff of ranks, as well as other acts in decree-laws that directly regulate the legal status 
of real or legal persons, except for the otherwise justiciable acts and the additional measures 
provided in decree-laws. 
The Commission consists of seven members. The Prime Minister appoints three members 
from public officials, the Minister of Justice appoints one member from judges and 
prosecutors, the Minister of the Interior appoints one member from local government 
personnel and the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors appoints one member each from 
the judge-rapporteurs of the Court of Cassation and the Council of State. Both the quorum 
and the quorum for decisions are four and no member can abstain from voting. The 
Commission is set to work for two years, subject to indefinite one-year extensions. The 
Commission will dismiss any of its members who becomes subject to an investigation on the 
account that he is a member of or affiliated to organisations defined as a threat to national 
security by the National Security Council or to terror groups—the same uniform wording 
with the reason given for all the dismissals in decree-laws. 
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The applications to the Commission will be filed through governorates or the latest institution 
the applicant worked at before dismissal. Importantly, the 60-day rule in the Law of 
Administrative Procedure, which stipulates that the silence of the administrative bodies is 
regarded as refusal after 60 days following a request and that the subject of the request 
becomes justiciable afterwards, is not applicable to the Commission. 
The Commission will either accept or dismiss the application. If the Commission accepts an 
application of a dismissed official, the applicant will be reinstated to a public post in line with 
his latest rank and status. If an application with regard to the closing of an organisation is 
accepted, the provisions of closure with all its consequences will lose effect ab initio. The 
decree-law also provides that the applicants have the right to appeal to administrative courts 
of Ankara against the decisions of the Commission, with the exception of judges and 
prosecutors, who will apply directly to the Council of State. The procedures governing the 
working of the Commission are to be regulated by the Prime Minister. 
Although the establishment of the Commission seems to follow the recommendations of the 
Venice Commission7 and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe8, and 
purports to soften the terms of the state of emergency, there are several reasons to see this 
step as a delaying tactic that subverts the rule of law and disproportionately constrains the 
right of access to court. 
By issuing decree-laws, the Government has been directly dismissing public officials and 
also authorising all public institutions to dismiss their personnel. In either case of dismissals, 
no individual-specific reason for dismissal or evidence is ever provided. This unconstitutional 
practice, however, has been going legally unchallenged. By another decree-law, the 
Government now created the Commission, which has no constitutional guarantee and is 
subject to the decree-law regime, meaning that its composition, working procedures and its 
authority can be altered or that it can even be abolished altogether—by yet another decree-
law. Moreover, the Commission is not a judicial body and it will be composed of seven 
members five of whom are appointed by the executive, and the majority of the Commission 
consists of bureaucrats and not members of the judiciary. Furthermore, the members of the 
                                                           
7 ‘Turkey: Opinion on Emergency Decree Laws Nos. 667-676 Adopted Following the Failed Coup of 15 July 
2016’, European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) (Venice, 9-10 December 
2016), www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2016)037-e, paras. 220-23. 
8 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy, Ad hoc 
Sub-Committee on recent developments in Turkey, ‘Report on the fact-finding visit to Ankara (21-23 November 
2016)’, AS/Pol (2016) 18rev, 15 December 2016, website-pace.net/documents/18848/2197130/20161215-
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Commission will be under immense pressure, as there is nothing to stop another decree-law 
permanently dismissing them from public service, simply by adding their names to a new list 
of dismissed officials. It is extremely difficult for the members to act impartially and remain 
independent of the executive. The matter of procedural rules regarding the burden of proof, 
evidence, and standards of review also remains an open question. The criminal nature of the 
generic allegation of “membership or affiliation to organisations defined as a threat to 
national security by the National Security Council or to terror groups” makes the 
Commission’s role even more ambiguous. This troublesome design is aggravated by the fact 
that there is no time limit on reviewing the applications. The exemption from the 60-day rule 
effectively means that there is an indefinite period of time before an applicant can 
contemplate litigation, which will then have to start from scratch at the doorstep of the first 
instance administrative court, to be followed by an appeal to the regional administrative 
court, then to the Council of State, after which the Constitutional Court and the ECtHR will 
finally hear his complaints. Additionally, it remains unknown what the right to appeal to 
administrative courts against the decisions of the Commission is provided for. By what 
standards are the decisions to be reviewed? What will be the effect of the decision of the 
administrative courts, considering that they cannot invalidate decree-laws? The 
administrative judicial review of the decisions does not seem to be able to yield anything 
more than perhaps a reconsideration of the application by the Commission. 
It should be kept in mind that the establishment of the Commission is not aimed at reviewing 
the human rights violations resulting from the dismissals, such as the violations of the right to 
a fair trial, the principle of no punishment without law, the right to respect for private and 
family life, the right to an effective remedy, the right to property and the prohibition of 
discrimination, but reviewing the acts of dismissal themselves. It would be a mistake for the 
Constitutional Court and the ECtHR to suspend the cases before them that arose from the 
dismissals by way of decree-laws. It is impossible that human rights violations and damages 
will be remedied by the Commission as the extent of its power is to reinstate the dismissed 
persons and to invalidate the closing of organisations. Therefore, the review by the 
Commission should not be regarded as an effective domestic remedy. International observers 
should remain vigilant with regard not only to the work of the Commission, but also to the 
composition and its degree of independence from the influence of the executive. The Political 
Affairs Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe hastily 
Draft copy – final version appears in Public Law [2017], April issue 
  
 
 
5 
welcomed the establishment of the Commission,9 but it should ensure its plaudit is dependent 
upon the Commission’s fulfilment of what it is expected to attain. It must be emphasised that 
the Commission’s duty is complementary to the function of the Constitutional Court and the 
ECtHR, as its authority is to simply reinstate a previous legal status but not to award damages 
for possible human rights violations which will not be remedied automatically by 
reinstatement. 
In any case, the way the Commission has been set up indicates that the effort is not to make 
reparations to those unfairly dismissed, but rather to delay the fully-fledged human rights 
review by the Constitutional Court and the ECtHR that will expose the fundamental 
unconstitutionality of dismissals by decree-laws and grave human rights violations. The best 
course of action is to keep the channels of human rights review open as it will compel the 
Commission to take its duty seriously, as well as helping identify and compensate human 
rights violations within a reasonable time. 
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